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Treaty Interpretation After R. v. 
Marshall; R. v. Bernard 
Mahmud Jamal∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard1 is no doubt one of the most important 
rulings on Aboriginal title and treaty rights to be released by the 
Supreme Court of Canada for some time. The decision contains much to 
ponder about both the nature of Aboriginal title and how to interpret 
historical treaties. This paper focuses on the treaty issues in Marshall; 
Bernard, against the backdrop of the Court’s earlier rulings in Marshall 
1 and Marshall 2, and seeks to identify some issues and implications for 
treaty litigation arising out of the Court’s ruling. 
II. MARSHALL; BERNARD ON TREATY RIGHTS 
1. The “Peace and Friendship” Treaties of 1760 and 1761 
Marshall; Bernard is the third case in a trilogy of Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with the trade clause in the Mi’kmaq “Peace and 
Friendship” treaties. These treaties were concluded in 1760 and 1761 
between the British and the Mi’kmaq peoples of the former colony of 
Nova Scotia, now the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
Briefly, the background to these treaties was that the British had 
succeeded in driving the French from Nova Scotia and wanted peace 
with their former enemies, the Mi’kmaq, who had been allies and 
trading partners with the French for almost 250 years. To secure peace, 
the British agreed under the treaties to set up trading posts or 
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for the New Brunswick Forest Products Association, an intervener in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard 
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444 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
“truckhouses” to allow the Mi’kmaq to continue their traditional trade 
formerly conducted with the French, but the Mi’kmaq were now 
required to trade exclusively with the British at the truckhouses. The 
pact was mutually beneficial in that the British acquired peace with the 
Mi’kmaq, while the Mi’kmaq preserved their access to European 
goods.2 
The operative trade clause in the treaty expresses a straightforward 
negative covenant of the Mi’kmaq Chiefs not to trade except with the 
British at the truckhouses. It reads: 
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any 
Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such 
Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty’s 
Governor....3 
However, the interpretation of this clause has proved anything but 
straightforward. This brief but mischievous trade clause has now been 
the subject of three significant rulings from the Supreme Court of 
Canada. These rulings are reviewed below, as the background for a 
discussion of the treaty aspects of the Marshall; Bernard decision. 
2. Marshall 1 
The first case in the trilogy is the Supreme Court’s 1999 ruling in R. v. 
Marshall, known as “Marshall 1”.4 In Marshall 1, the Court had to 
decide whether the trade clause protected the right of the Mi’kmaq 
peoples to engage in commercial fishing (or fishing for trade) contrary 
to federal fishing regulations. In a 5-2 decision, Binnie J. for a majority 
of the Court held that the Mi’kmaq had such a treaty right to “fish for 
trade”. Justice Binnie found that the treaty affirmed “the right of the 
Mi’kmaq people to continue to provide for their own sustenance by 
taking the products of their hunting, fishing and other gathering 
activities and trading for what in 1760 was termed ‘necessaries’”.5 
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  Id., at paras. 7-8, per McLachlin C.J. 
3
  Id., at para. 8. 
4
  [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter “Marshall 1”]. Justice Binnie 
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5
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Justice Binnie frankly accepted that this conclusion did not flow 
from the words of the written treaty itself. As he put it: “It seems clear 
that the words of the March 10, 1760 document, standing in isolation, 
do not support” the existence of such a treaty right. However, in his 
view this was not the end of the analysis: “[t]he question is whether the 
underlying negotiations produced a broader agreement between the 
British and the Mi’kmaq, memorialized only in part in the Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship”.6 Justice Binnie found such a broader agreement 
through an elaborate analysis of the wording of the treaty and extrinsic 
historical sources, including the historical and cultural context, earlier 
Mi’kmaq treaties with the British, the minutes of the negotiating 
sessions between the British and the Maliseet (who concluded a similar 
treaty with the British), and the expert evidence tendered at trial. Based 
on this review, he concluded that the treaty was “partly oral and partly 
written”.7 
Justice Binnie stated that such a broader approach was justified 
because the Court had long since rejected a strict or technical approach 
to treaty interpretation. He nevertheless warned that “[g]enerous rules of 
interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-the-
fact largesse”. As he explained, “the bottom line is the Court’s 
obligation is to ‘choose from among the various possible interpretations 
of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made] the one which 
best reconciles’ the Mi’kmaq interests and those of the British Crown.”8 
Justice Binnie acknowledged that while the right to fish was not 
mentioned either in the text of the treaty, or in the underlying 
negotiations, he was prepared to imply such a term, noting by analogy to 
the law of contract that “[c]ourts will imply a contractual term on the 
basis of the presumed intentions of the parties which is necessary to 
assure the efficacy of the contract”. In his view, such a presumed 
intention could be derived by applying the “officious bystander test” 
from contract law, a well known judicial construct for implying 
contractual terms that reflect the unexpressed will of the contracting 
parties to fill gaps that they have left.9 Justice Binnie concluded that, 
having regard to the honour of the Crown, an officious bystander would 
have inferred that the Mi’kmaq were assured continuing access to 
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resources in order to engage in traditional trading activities. In his view, 
to simply read the Mi’kmaq’s positive trade demand into a negative 
Mi’kmaq covenant would not be consistent with the honour and 
integrity of the Crown.10 Justice Binnie thus held that “the surviving 
substance of the treaty is not the literal promise of a truckhouse, but a 
treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing 
by trading the products of those traditional activities subject to 
restrictions that can be justified under the Badger test”.11 
In dissent, McLachlin J. (as she then was) took a narrower view of 
what the treaty protected. She concluded that the treaty “created an 
exclusive trade and truckhouse regime which implicitly gave rise to a 
limited Mi’kmaq right to bring goods to British trade outlets so long as 
this regime was extant”. The treaty granted no “freestanding” right to 
truckhouses or to trade outside of the truckhouse regime: “[t]he system 
of trade exclusivity and correlative British trading outlets died out in the 
1780s and with it, the incidental right to bring goods to trade.”12 
Justice McLachlin was evidently concerned that the majority’s 
conclusion created “an unintended right of broad and undefined 
scope”.13 She warned presciently of the dangers of the majority’s 
expansive approach, foreshadowing the Court’s need to clarify Marshall 
1 in Marshall 2 and to then further explain those reasons again in 
Marshall; Bernard. The majority’s approach, she noted, rendered the 
treaty rights “inchoate” and made it impossible for the Crown to justify 
limitations on such treaty rights. This would function to create 
illegitimately an unintended right of broad and undefined scope. Instead, 
in McLachlin J.’s view the correct approach is to begin by defining the 
core of the treaty right and to seek its modern counterpart. This allows a 
court to assess whether the law in question derogates from that right and 
to address any justifications for such derogation in a meaningful way.14 
While McLachlin J.’s reasons on the interpretation of the treaty did 
not command a majority of the Court, her discussion will continue to be 
relevant for distilling the canons of treaty interpretation established by 
earlier cases. She set out the following guiding principles: 
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This Court has set out the principles governing treaty interpretation on 
many occasions. They include the following. 
1 Aboriginal treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and 
attract special principles of interpretation […] 
2 Treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities or doubtful 
expressions should be resolved in favour of the aboriginal 
signatories […] 
3 The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the 
various possible interpretations of common intention the one 
which best reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the 
treaty was signed […] 
4 In searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity 
and honour of the Crown is presumed […] 
5 In determining the signatories’ respective understanding and 
intentions, the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and 
linguistic differences between the parties […] 
6 The words of the treaty must be given the sense which they would 
naturally have held for the parties at the time […]  
7 A technical or contractual interpretation of treaty wording should 
be avoided […] 
8 While construing the language generously, courts cannot alter the 
terms of the treaty by exceeding what “is possible on the 
language” or realistic […]  
9 Treaty rights of aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a 
static or rigid way. They are not frozen at the date of signature. 
The interpreting court must update treaty rights to provide for 
their modern exercise. This involves determining what modern 
practices are reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its 
modern context […]15 
3. Marshall 2 
Exactly two months after releasing Marshall 1, the Court released 
Marshall 2,16 ostensibly to dispose of a motion for a re-hearing brought 
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by an intervener in Marshall 1. However, the Court’s now unanimous 
decision goes much further than simply rejecting the re-hearing request, 
taking the unusual step of elaborating extensively on the earlier majority 
ruling. 
The Court in Marshall 2 explained that Marshall 1 recognized the 
Mi’kmaq’s treaty right to “work for a living through continuing access 
to fish and wildlife to trade for ‘necessaries’, which a majority of the 
Court interpreted as ‘food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few 
amenities’”.17 However, the Court emphasized that Marshall 1 did not 
establish “a treaty right ‘to gather’ anything and everything physically 
capable of being gathered. The issues were much narrower and the 
ruling was much narrower”. The Court cautioned that the question of 
whether the treaty protects trade in other natural resources, such as 
logging, minerals or offshore natural gas deposits, would have to await 
the presentation of proper historical evidence and argument in future 
cases.18 
4. Marshall; Bernard 
Just over four years later, the Court had to decide the very issue it had 
raised but refused to consider in Marshall 2 — whether the treaty 
protected a right to engage in commercial logging. In Marshall; 
Bernard, the Court had before it appeals from Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick in which various Mi’kmaq loggers had invoked the treaty in 
defence to provincial prosecutions for logging on Crown lands without 
authorization. The accused were all convicted at trial; and their initial 
appeals to the summary conviction appeal courts were dismissed; but 
their further appeals to the provincial courts of appeal were then 
allowed. In Marshall, the convictions were set aside and new trials 
ordered; while in Bernard, the conviction was set aside and an acquittal 
entered.19 On further appeal, the Supreme Court allowed both appeals, 
concluding that the treaty did not protect commercial logging. 
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Although the seven justices who heard the case were unanimous in 
the result, two sets of reasons were delivered.20 Chief Justice McLachlin 
wrote for the majority of five justices; while LeBel J. wrote separate 
reasons for two justices concurring in the result.21 
In her majority reasons, McLachlin C.J. stated that Marshall 1 held 
that “the treaties of 1760-61 conferred on the Mi’kmaq the right to catch 
and sell fish for a moderate livelihood, on the ground that this activity 
was the logical evolution of a trading practice that was within the 
contemplation of the parties to the treaties”.22 The issue in Marshall; 
Bernard was now the scope of this right, and in particular, whether it 
extended to commercial logging. 
Two contrasting interpretations were presented to the Court. The 
first interpretation, presented by the Mi’kmaq respondents, focused on 
the use of resources, and contended that if the resource in issue was 
gathered or used by Mi’kmaq in an Aboriginal economy in 1760, in any 
way or for any purpose, then it was protected by the treaty.23 
The second interpretation, urged by the Crown, contended that the 
treaty protected only those trading activities that were in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the treaty. The emphasis was 
thus not on what products were used, but on the contemplated trading 
activities. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that the Crown “accepts 
Marshall 1 and 2”, but argued that the truckhouse clause “merely 
granted the Mi’kmaq the right to continue to trade in items traded in 
1760-61. Only those trading activities were protected; other activities, 
not within the contemplation of the British and Mi’kmaq of the day, are 
not protected”. Chief Justice McLachlin noted that the Crown also 
accepted that “ancestral trading activities are not frozen in time; the 
treaty protects modern activities that can be said to be their logical 
evolution”. However, the Crown argued that modern commercial 
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  Justice Binnie recused himself from the hearing because before his appointment to the 
bench he had been retained by the Attorney General of New Brunswick in connection with R. v. 
Paul, [1998] N.B.J. No. 439, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (C.A.), a case involving a claimed right of the 
Mi’kmaq to harvest timber for trade in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia: see letter from S.C.C. 
Registrar to parties and interveners dated December 17, 2004. As a result, McLachlin C.J. was the 
only justice from Marshall 1 who sat on Marshall; Bernard. (Justice Major had been on the Court 
during Marshall 1 and 2, but did not sit on either case; Major J. did however sit on Marshall; 
Bernard). 
21
  Justices Major, Bastarache, Abella and Charron concurred with the Chief Justice’s 
reasons, while Fish J. concurred with the reasons of LeBel J. 
22
  Id., at para. 13. 
23
  Id., at paras. 14-15. 
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logging was not protected because it would transform the treaty right 
into something new and different.24 
Chief Justice McLachlin preferred the Crown’s interpretation. She 
found that its argument was supported by the purpose of the truckhouse 
clause and its wording, and by the historical record as interpreted in 
Marshall 1 and 2.  
Chief Justice McLachlin explained that the purpose of the clause 
was to be a trade clause, concerned with what could be traded.25 It was 
concerned “with traditionally traded products”. Chief Justice McLachlin 
noted that while this right to trade in traditional products “carried with it 
an implicit right to harvest those resources”, this was merely as “the 
adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products. The right 
conferred is not the right to harvest, in itself, but the right to trade”.26  
Chief Justice McLachlin further noted that nothing in the wording 
of the truckhouse clause conferred “a general right to harvest or gather 
all natural resources then used”.27  
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that this view was also 
consistent with the historical record as interpreted in Marshall 1 and 2, 
which supported a limited treaty right to “trade in the products the 
Mi’kmaq had traditionally traded with the Europeans”.28 
Chief Justice McLachlin also cautioned that this interpretation did 
not preclude treaty rights from evolving as a result of changes in the 
economy or technology; however, she explained that any such evolution 
must involve an evolved treaty-protected activity that is “essentially the 
same”. “Logical evolution means the same sort of activity, carried on in 
the modern economy by modern means. This prevents aboriginal rights 
from being unfairly confined simply by changes in the economy and 
technology. But the activity must be essentially the same”. Chief Justice 
McLachlin affirmed that while treaty rights are capable of evolution 
within limits, their subject matter cannot be wholly transformed.29 
In conclusion, McLachlin C.J. held that the treaty does not protect 
“the right to harvest and dispose of particular commodities”, but rather 
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  Id., at para. 18. 
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  Id., at para. 19. 
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  Id., at para. 20. 
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  Id., at paras. 21-24. 
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protects only “the right to practice a traditional 1760 trading activity in 
the modern way and modern context”.30 
Chief Justice McLachlin found that the trial judges in both cases had 
correctly identified this focus on trade as being the scope of the treaty 
right, and based on the evidence had found that the Mi’kmaq people did 
not engage in any traditional commercial logging activity at the time of 
the treaty.31 She noted that while the evidence did disclose some 
secondary, occasional and incidental trade in wood products, in items 
such as baskets, snowshoes and canoes, there was no evidence of any 
traditional trade in logs.32 As McLachlin C.J. stated: “Logging was not a 
traditional Mi’kmaq activity. Rather, it was a European activity, in 
which the Mi’kmaq began to participate only decades after the treaties 
of 1760-61.”33 To the contrary, McLachlin C.J. noted that there was 
evidence that logging was “inimical to the Mi’kmaq’s traditional way of 
life, interfering with fishing”, which was a traditional activity.34 Further, 
one of the Mi’kmaq witnesses had even conceded the unlikelihood that 
the Mi’kmaq contemplated commercial logging during the treaty 
process. There was similarly no evidence that the British ever 
contemplated trade in anything but traditionally produced products, like 
fur or fish.35 Chief Justice McLachlin therefore rejected the treaty claims 
in both appeals. 
Justice LeBel agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the treaty 
did not protect commercial logging. However, LeBel J. placed a 
different emphasis on the nature of the right, or rights, protected by the 
treaty. Justice LeBel’s reasons emphasized that the treaty protected both 
a right to trade and a right of access to resources for the purpose of 
trade. 
Justice LeBel’s reasons repeatedly emphasized that two separate 
rights are protected, albeit two “closely intertwined” rights. He stated 
that “the protected treaty right includes not only a right to trade but also 
a corresponding right of access to resources for the purpose of 
engaging in trading activities”.36 Elsewhere, LeBel J. noted that 
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  Id., at para. 26. 
31
  Id., at paras. 27-34. 
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  Id., at para. 33. 
33
  Id., at para. 34. 
34
  Id. 
35
  Id., at para. 33. 
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  Id., at para. 110 (emphasis added). 
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“although the treaty does protect traditional trading activities, the treaty 
right comprises both a right to trade and a right of access to resources. 
There is no right to trade in the abstract because a right to trade implies 
a corresponding right of access to resources for trade”.37 He later 
repeated the dual character of the rights (as compared to right): “The 
treaty protects both a right to trade and a right of access to resources, 
and these rights are closely intertwined”.38 
Based on his “two rights” approach to the treaty, LeBel J. 
articulated the test for treaty protection slightly differently from the 
majority. Justice LeBel’s test asked whether “the resource and resource-
extracting activity for which the respondents seek treaty protection must 
reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties”.39 
However, based on the evidence in these cases, LeBel J. agreed with 
the Chief Justice that logging was not in the contemplation of the parties 
and was not the logical evolution of Mi’kmaq treaty rights.40 
Consequently, in the result LeBel J. similarly rejected the treaty claims. 
III. SOME ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS  
FLOWING FROM MARSHALL; BERNARD 
1. What Was Left Unsaid? 
The relative brevity of the reasons in Marshall; Bernard belie their 
complexity. Indeed, the reasons are as interesting and important for 
what they omit as for what they contain. 
For example, the Court’s reasons leave the impression that the 
Crown had accepted Marshall 1 as binding authority. Indeed McLachlin 
C.J. stated that the Crown “accepts Marshall 1 and 2, but argues that the 
respondent misread them”. But this was not quite right. While the 
Attorney General of New Brunswick (as well as the Attorneys General 
of Canada, Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta and 
Newfoundland and Labrador) accepted Marshall 1 and 2 as good law, 
the Attorney General of Nova Scotia emphatically did not. Nova Scotia 
directed a substantial portion of its appellant’s factum to the argument 
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  Id., at para. 113 (emphasis added). 
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  Id., at paras. 116-117. 
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that the majority decision in Marshall 1 was per incuriam because the 
significance of certain evidence tendered in that case had not been fully 
appreciated by the Court.41 Nova Scotia’s position was that “there is no 
right to hunt, fish and gather and trade for necessaries” under the 1760-
61 treaties.42 For unstated reasons, the Court decided not to address this 
argument. 
The Court also decided not to address the content of the “moderate 
livelihood” limit to the exercise of the treaty right emerging from 
Marshall 1 and 2.43 For example, in the Bernard case the accused had 
failed to establish, as part of his defence, that his logging was limited to 
securing necessaries. The only evidence was that he had purchased a 
tractor-trailer to participate in the “Native commercial wood harvest”, 
and that he was caught hauling 23 spruce logs, his second load that day 
alone. There was no other evidence as to whether his overall logging 
activities were below the moderate livelihood limit, nor evidence as to 
whether he was already earning a moderate livelihood through other 
forms of traditional hunting, fishing and gathering for trade, which he 
was now seeking to supplement through logging. Such a lack of 
evidence effectively left the lower courts guessing the value of the logs 
harvested and without any information about other potential sources of 
income from the exercise of treaty rights. 
Similarly, the Court declined to deal with issues such as whether the 
accused were exercising their claimed communal treaty rights with 
“community authority” (and how to prove such authority), as well as 
other thorny issues such as the territories covered by the treaty and 
possible extinguishment of the treaty rights through pre-Confederation 
legislation.44 
2. Does Marshall; Bernard Merely Clarify or Retrench from 
Marshall 1? 
Marshall; Bernard clarifies and maybe even retrenches somewhat from 
the sweeping approach to treaty interpretation in Marshall 1, just as 
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  Nova Scotia had not participated in Marshall 1. 
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  Factum of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, at paras. 87-122. 
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  Supra, note 1, at para. 36. 
44
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Marshall 2 had done so in respect of Marshall 1.45 Certainly, there were 
those who (like McLachlin J. in Marshall 1) had highlighted the Trojan-
horse approach to treaty interpretation endorsed by Binnie J. For 
example, Professor Peter Hogg called Marshall 1 “a remarkable 
example of the generous interpretation of an Indian treaty”.46 In his 
view, “[i]t was a considerable stretch to interpret this clause, in form 
nothing more than a negative restraint on the ability of the Mi’kmaq to 
trade with non-governmental purchasers, as a protection of the 
defendant’s commercial fishing activity.”47 
Dean Patrick Monahan similarly warned that Marshall 1 could lead 
to a very expansive approach to treaty interpretation going well beyond 
the written treaty language, and indeed could relegate the written treaty 
terms to merely “one more piece of evidence in clarifying the true 
agreement of the parties”. As Dean Monahan explained: 
The rule that a Treaty is defined by the terms of the written document 
appears to have been qualified materially by the Supreme Court 
decision in R. v. Marshall. […] 
It is true, as Binnie J. pointed out in Marshall, that courts have in the 
past been willing to interpret rights in a Treaty so as to make the 
exercise of those rights effective and meaningful. What is novel about 
the approach of the majority in Marshall, however, was the Court’s 
willingness to imply a term into a Treaty to render effective a right 
that was not part of the Treaty itself. Moreover, the approach in 
Marshall invites litigants to argue that the “real Treaty” is the 
understanding of the parties, as reflected in the context underlying the 
negotiations, as opposed to the written Treaty document itself. On this 
theory, the written document merely becomes one more piece of 
evidence of the real agreement of the parties. This approach to treaty 
interpretation goes significantly beyond previous cases, which had 
focused on giving meaning and effect to the written language of the 
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  See, for example, Bruce H. Wildsmith, Q.C., “Vindicating Mi’kmaq Rights: The 
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  Id., at 27-33. 
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Treaty, and could have material implications for the interpretation of a 
wide variety of treaties.48 
At the end of the day, whether Marshall; Bernard is described as 
merely clarifying Marshall 1 or retrenching from it probably involves 
more semantics than substance. Clearly, this latest majority decision is 
now the lens through which the earlier rulings must be viewed. But how 
ironic it is that it would fall to McLachlin C.J. — the only remaining 
justice from Marshall 1 — to explain the ambit of the earlier ruling 
from which she had dissented. 
3. How to Ascertain Common Intention? 
If the bottom line of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the parties’ 
common intention at the time the treaty was made, then Marshall; 
Bernard offers valuable guidance on how to prove that intention. 
First, the ruling shows that direct evidence of intent may be 
tendered through witnesses. Here, for example, the Court relied on 
Chief Augustine’s testimony that, in his view, it was “unlikely” that the 
Mi’kmaq contemplated commercial logging during the treaty process.49 
Counsel should therefore take heed that they are not limited to arguing 
common intent based on the entrails of the historical record. 
Second, the ruling shows that Aboriginal oral history can be critical 
evidence against a treaty claim. In this case, both McLachlin C.J.50 and 
LeBel J.51 relied on the evidence of Chief Augustine to the effect that 
Aboriginal oral history recorded that logging was inimical to the 
Mi’kmaq’s traditional fishing way of life. The Court inferred from this 
that logging cannot have been contemplated by the parties as having 
been protected by the treaty. The Mi’kmaq’s oral history, as recounted 
by Chief Augustine, contained stories of how 
British people [were] coming in and cutting timber, cutting large big 
trees and moving them down the river systems and clogging up the 
                                                                                                            
48
  Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 452-53, 
454-55. See also Bradford W. Morse, “Aboriginal and Treaty Rights In Canada”, ch. 17 of Gérald-
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rivers, I guess, with bark and remnants of debris from cutting up 
lumber. And this didn’t allow the salmon to go up the rivers…52 
The lesson is thus that Aboriginal oral history can cut both ways. 
Third, the Court explicitly considered post-treaty conduct as 
evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of the treaty. The Court noted 
that the Mi’kmaq did not engage in logging until the 1780s, several 
decades after the treaty was concluded, and that it “was only in the 19th 
century that the Mi’kmaq began to harvest forest resources to trade in 
forest products with the British”.53 Again, therefore, counsel can and 
should look to the parties’ conduct after the claimed treaty right was 
concluded. 
Fourth, the Court’s decision shows more generally how critical it is 
for an Aboriginal claimant to tender appropriate evidence to establish a 
treaty claim. The ruling shows great sensitivity to the historical record 
and evidences considerable reluctance to engage in abstract conjecture 
outside that record. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the “ubiquitous 
officious bystander”, who had figured so prominently in Marshall 1 as a 
means of inferring a treaty right to fish, is totally out of sight in this 
ruling. The message seems to be that in the future treaty rights will not 
lightly be inferred absent a proper historical foundation. 
4. How Far Can Treaty Rights “Logically Evolve”? 
Another judicial concept that had figured prominently in Marshall 1 and 
2, but which is much more tightly constrained in Marshall; Bernard, is 
the concept of logical evolution of treaty rights.  
In Marshall 2, the Court had said that “[w]hile treaty rights are 
capable of evolution within limits […] their subject matter (absent a 
new agreement) cannot be wholly transformed”.54 This language had 
been debated extensively by the lower courts in Marshall and Bernard, 
and formed the basis for the argument advanced by the Aboriginal 
respondents and interveners that trade in some wood products at the 
time of the treaty could “logically evolve” into a right to engage in 
commercial logging. 
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53
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The Court in Marshall; Bernard has emphatically rejected this line 
of reasoning. As McLachlin C.J. explained: “Logical evolution means 
the same sort of activity, carried on in the modern economy by modern 
means […] the activity must be essentially the same”.55 This approach 
necessarily invites a qualitative comparison between the traditional 
trade activity and the claimed modern, evolved treaty right. It poses the 
question, is the activity essentially the same, or is it fundamentally 
different? In this case, the Court accepted the lower court’s qualitative 
comparison that “[c]ommercial logging does not bear the same relation 
to the traditional limited use of forest products as fishing for eels today 
bears to fishing for eels or any other species in 1760”.56 Effectively, the 
Court found that commercial logging was a universe removed from 
limited traditional wood use, and as such the former could not logically 
evolve into the latter. 
This narrower approach to the “logical evolution” of treaty rights is 
entirely consistent with the Court’s prior decisions. The Court has 
properly eschewed a “frozen-in-time approach to treaty rights”, and 
ruled that treaty provisions must be interpreted “in a flexible way that is 
sensitive to the evolution of changes in normal practice”.57 Thus, a treaty 
right to fish for trade can evolve into the right to fish using an “outboard 
motor”;58 a treaty right to hunt can evolve into a right to hunt with a 
rifle;59 and a right to build shelter incidental to the right to hunt can 
evolve into a right to build a log cabin for the purpose of hunting.60 The 
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  Marshall; Bernard, at para. 25 (emphasis added). 
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question in each case is to determine “what modern practices are 
reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its modern context”.61 
The purpose of rejecting the frozen-in-time approach is to give 
meaning to the protection of “existing” Aboriginal and treaty rights 
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It allows section 35(1) 
rights to be “affirmed in contemporary form rather than in their 
primeval simplicity and vigour”.62 The Court’s decision in Marshall; 
Bernard, while faithful to this approach, helpfully explains the limited 
ambit of what will (and will not) constitute a logical evolution. 
5. Is There Any Difference Between McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J. 
on the Treaty?  
As noted, LeBel J. felt the need to issue separate reasons concurring in 
the result in Marshall; Bernard, which naturally raises the question of 
whether LeBel J.’s reasons differ in substance from those of McLachlin 
C.J. on the treaty issue, and if so, how? 
In her treaty analysis, McLachlin C.J. placed the emphasis on what 
was traded. She then found that the trade right carried with it “an 
implicit right to harvest those resources”, which was merely the 
“adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products”.63 Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s analysis therefore proceeds on the basis of a single, 
express treaty right to trade, accompanied by an implied right to harvest 
resources for trade. 
By contrast, LeBel J. did not appear to prioritize the rights in this 
way. In his view, two separate rights are involved, albeit two “closely 
intertwined” rights. In his view, the treaty protected both a right to trade 
and a right of access to resources for the purpose of trade. 
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Is there any practical difference between McLachlin C.J.’s “one 
right” approach and LeBel J.’s “two rights” approach? It would seem 
that such a difference could materialize only if one of LeBel J.’s closely 
intertwined rights could somehow become unstuck from the other, such 
that the right of access to resources could be exercised separate and 
apart from whether the resource was ultimately traded. However, in 
various places LeBel J. qualifies the right of access to resources as being 
“for the purpose of engaging in trading activities”,64 and as a “right of 
access to resources for trade”.65 This suggests that the access right is not 
free-standing at all, but rather is superglued to the trade right. 
However, LeBel J.’s approach arguably could lead to a different 
approach to proving a treaty right. On his view, it would seem that 
evidence would be needed for both the trade right and the access right, 
whereas under McLachlin C.J.’s approach proof of the access right 
would be unnecessary as that right would be inferred from proof of the 
trade right. 
Perhaps it is also conceivable that resources could be harvested for 
the purpose of trade (and thus authorized by treaty) without actually 
being traded. On this view, LeBel J.’s two rights approach could yield a 
different result that McLachlin C.J.’s approach.  
However, barring such unusual instances at the periphery, it would 
seem that LeBel J.’s approach involves more of a difference in emphasis 
than substance. 
6. What Will Be the Impact for Future Resources? 
There is little doubt that Marshall; Bernard will largely foreclose 
attempts to extend this treaty to cover other resources such as minerals 
and offshore natural gas deposits, which had been identified by 
Aboriginal groups in Marshall 2 as being protected.66 Marshall; 
Bernard refocuses the analysis on traditional trade activities. Aboriginal 
peoples must now establish that a resource was a “traditionally traded 
product” and show evidence of “trade in products [which] the Mi’kmaq 
traded with the Europeans”. This is most unlikely to extend to minerals 
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and offshore natural gas deposits, although the determination of such 
matters will of course ultimately depend on the historical evidence. 
7. Should Treaty Rights Be Determined in Summary Conviction 
Proceedings? 
Lastly, LeBel J.’s reasons in Marshall; Bernard contain a very 
interesting analysis of the appropriateness of determining treaty rights 
and Aboriginal title claims in summary conviction proceedings. 
By way of background, in Bernard one of the justices of the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal had pointed out the procedural unfairness in 
using summary conviction proceedings to make findings on Aboriginal 
title that could cloud the property rights of non-parties.67 In Bernard, the 
claim for Aboriginal title covered from one quarter to one third of the 
Province of New Brunswick, while in Marshall it extended to the entire 
Province of Nova Scotia. The Aboriginal title claims also raised broader 
issues, such as whether the Mi’kmaq were required to share the forest 
resources with the present Crown licensees and whether Aboriginal title 
was extinguished by the creation of reserves. Before the Supreme Court, 
several of the parties and interveners echoed these concerns and urged 
the Court to refrain from addressing the Aboriginal title issues in the 
context of these summary conviction proceedings. 
While McLachlin C.J.’s reasons did not refer to these arguments,68 
they were picked up in LeBel J.’s concurring reasons. Interestingly, 
LeBel J. concluded that it was time for the Court to “re-think the 
appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title issues in 
the context of criminal trials”. As he explained: 
The issues that are determined in the context of these cases have little 
to do with the criminality of the accused’s conduct; rather, the claims 
would properly be the subject of civil actions for declarations. 
Procedural and evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating 
aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence, the 
interpretation of evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary 
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burdens, but also out of the scope of appellate review of the trial 
judge’s findings of fact. These claims may also impact on the 
competing rights and interests of a number of parties who may have a 
right to be heard at all stages of the process. In addition, special 
difficulties come up when dealing with broad title and treaty rights 
claims that involve geographic areas extending beyond the specific 
sites relating to the criminal charges. 
Justice LeBel concluded that “there is little doubt that the legal 
issues to be determined in the context of aboriginal rights claims are 
much larger than the criminal charge itself and that the criminal process 
is inadequate and inappropriate for dealing with such claims”. He 
suggested that in future when Aboriginal rights issues arise in the 
context of summary conviction proceedings, the Crown should consider 
seeking a temporary stay of the charges to allow the Aboriginal claims 
to be properly litigated in the civil courts. Once the claims are 
adjudicated in civil courts, “the Crown could then decide whether to 
proceed with the criminal charges”.69 
There is considerable force to LeBel J.’s analysis that Aboriginal 
title and treaty claims should be addressed only in a properly constituted 
action for a declaration and not in a regulatory prosecution. It seems 
only fair that private parties throughout the province should not have 
their property rights thrown into limbo without knowing precisely the 
claims alleged and having an opportunity to be heard. 
To this end, the courts have traditionally found that Aboriginal title 
claims require proper pleadings. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
for example, it will be recalled that the Supreme Court ordered a new 
trial after concluding that a pleadings defect (the title claim was framed 
differently on appeal than at trial) prevented the Court from considering 
the merits of the appeal.70 Similarly, other courts have traditionally 
required title claims to be framed within properly constituted actions.71 
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It is arguably no answer to these concerns to say that the Court is 
stuck with the procedural posture of a regulatory case and that any 
affected private parties should intervene at trial. The courts are 
justifiably concerned about permitting interveners where liberty 
interests are at stake,72 given the spectre of unfairness (“ganging up” on 
the accused), delay in the proceedings and prejudice to the accused’s 
right to a fair trial.73 As such, it seems only fair that such broad-ranging 
Aboriginal title and treaty issues should be addressed only where all 
interested parties have the right to be present and protect their interests. 
Justice LeBel’s suggestion that the criminal proceedings be stayed 
to allow for civil claims raises several practical issues, however. 
Presumably a criminal proceeding could be stayed only with the 
accused’s concurrence to become a civil plaintiff. A criminal defendant 
may well agree to the staying of the criminal charges, but they must then 
also agree to file a statement of claim and to move the civil proceedings 
forward as plaintiff. This could substantially change the cost, strategy 
and dynamics of Aboriginal litigation, and it is at least an open question 
as to whether an Aboriginal accused would have any interest or 
incentive in agreeing to such a proposal. 
Nevertheless, for the moment LeBel J.’s interesting analysis of this 
problem of litigation of Aboriginal issues in the criminal courts remains 
a minority view. It is an open question as to whether his suggestion will 
be adopted in future cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While Marshall; Bernard raises many interesting questions, the decision 
will not be the last word on Aboriginal logging rights in the Maritimes 
or, perhaps, even elsewhere in Canada. On July 21, 2005, the day after 
releasing Marshall; Bernard, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal 
in R. v. Sappier and Polchies and R. v. Gray, two cases in which the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal (the same panel from R. v. Bernard no 
less) had affirmed the existence of both Aboriginal and treaty rights of 
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the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet Aboriginal peoples to engage in logging on 
Crown lands for “personal use” (as opposed to trade).74 It remains to be 
seen what the Court will make of these renewed logging claims. 
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